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Reliable information on small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) is rare and costly for 
financial intermediaries. To compensate for this, relationship banking is often considered as 
the appropriate lending technique in the case of SMEs. In this paper we offer a theoretical 
model to analyze the pricing behavior of banks in a Bertrand competition framework with 
monitoring costs. We show that the lack of reliable information leads to comparably high 
interest rates even if a long-term relationship between borrower and bank exists. The paper 
offers a theoretical explanation why SME managers consider external finance as a major 
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Sized Enterprises, Accounting  
JEL-classification:    D43, D 82, G21, M41   1. Introduction 
Typically, in industrialized countries small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) account for 
more than 90 percent of all firms, employ about two-thirds of the workforce, and contribute to 
nearly 50 percent of value added in non-agricultural production. In market economies SMEs 
are often considered to play an important role in growth promotion and poverty reduction 
(World Bank 1994, 2002, 2004; Beck et. al 2003; Wagenvoort 2003). Nevertheless, it seems 
to be a global phenomenon that SMEs are confronted with harsh credit constraints (Beck and 
Maksimovic 2002; European Commission 2002; Beck et. al. 2004). Recently, there is a lively 
discussion on the impact of  the Basel II regulation and the planned implementation of 
international accounting standards for SMEs on lending to this kind of firms (European 
Commission 1995; Berger 2004; IASB 2004).  
Until now the analytical framework concerning SMEs, information availability and price-
setting behavior of banks has been underdeveloped. Studies on accounting of SMEs point out 
that there is only limited interest in financial reporting (Carsberg et. al. 1985; Gibson and 
Wallschutzky 1992; Gibson 1993; McMahon 1996). Enhancing reporting practice is viewed 
as raising material and immaterial costs without delivering clear advantages (Horowitz and 
Kolodny 1982; Friedlob and Plewa 1992)
1. In this setting, relationship lending is considered 
as the most appropriate technique for collecting information on SMEs (Boot and Milbourn 
2002): the firm and the bank enter in a long-term relationship that assures the firm’s access to 
credit and gives the bank access to information about the firm (Allen and Saunders 1991; 
Nakamura 1992; Berger et. al. 1999; Boot 2000). One important feature of such a relation is 
the increase of the value of information (Schäfer 2003). Therefore one could expect that loan 
interest rates should decline during the relationship. Nevertheless, recent empirical literature 
on relationship banking offers ambiguous results: Peterson and Rajan (1994) suggest that loan 
interest rates decline with relationship lending
2. The opposite effect is described by Greenbaum et. al. (1989) and Sharpe (1990). They demonstrate conditions under which 
lenders subsidize borrowers in early periods and are reimbursed in later periods.
3 Based on so-
called “soft” information, this lending technique is mainly generated by banks’ past 
experience with a given lender. 
We argue that there exist linkages between the chosen lending technique and the loan interest 
rate. Our model is based on a Bertrand competition framework - frequently used in the credit 
market literature (Dell´Ariccia et. al. 1999; Jun and Vives 2004). An important advantage of 
this type of competition is that polypoly effects are generated in the duopoly case. Therefore 
differences in lending techniques are not superposed by duopoly - effects i.e. by strategic 
interactions of banks and firms. The lack of borrower market power is a key assumption of 
Bertrand competition (Gal-or 1986; Bracoud 2002). The model presented is related to 
previous studies where perfect competition is impeded by asymmetric information. In these 
settings, professional financial intermediaries like banks can make use of economies of scale 
in obtaining information about borrowers (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981; Diamond 1984, 1991; 
Ramakrishnan and Thakor 1984; Boyd and Pescott 1986)
4. A major finding of our paper is 
that with the duration of the lending relationship, loan interest rates are not reduced. 
Furthermore, we argue that in markets where banks rely on relationship lending, borrowers 
are charged with higher interest rates compared to markets where relationship lending and 
credit scoring/financial statement lending coexist. 
The aim of this paper is to fill at least three analytical gaps: First, we develop a theoretical 
model to analyze the pricing behavior of relationship banks in a Bertrand competition 
framework. Second, we discuss the effect of a given lending technique on lending behavior. 
Third, we discuss the impact of recent changes in the regulatory environment on SME 
lending. The key finding of the model is that there is a linkage between the lending technique 
used and the equilibrium loan interest rate. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we develop a model of banking with different lending techniques. In 
section 3 we discuss the results of the model, while section 4 offers conclusions. 
2. The Model 
We assume a number (  of firm borrowers, which want to realize a single investment 
project that requires one unit of funding and generates a random return. These borrowers are 
atomless and therefore have no market power. We further assume two banks; at least one of 
them relies on relationship lending technique. For simplification we assume that the 
distribution of borrowers regarding the maturity of their bank relationship is a continuous line 
with one borrower at every point, like pearls at a pearl necklace. The firms can have either 
good or bad investment opportunities, so that there are 
) A
 good and   bad investment 
projects. The return of the firms   is characterized by a binary random variate ( z which 
can adopt the values zero and one  0,1 z∈ . If z is 1, then the project is successful and the 
return is non-zero; if z is zero, then the return of the firm is zero as well. It is assumed that 
average return   of good projects  ) 1 ( g λ
G ( )
G
q  is higher than the “save" loan interest rate 
, while for bad projects  s r g + ≥1 ) 1 ( λ ( ) 1 q −  the average return falls below this 
value . As a consequence, banks do not lend to borrowers with bad projects s r +
Bg < ) 1 ( λ 1
5. On 
the demand side, we assume that the firm borrowers always apply for loans regardless of the 
project’s success 
6. Banks are the unique providers of funds and have access to competitive 
capital markets where they can fund themselves at the exogenous interest rate  p .  
( ) q ( ) q − 1
() gz )
{ }
A bank has the possibility to monitor borrowers and explore if a project is good or bad. 
Monitoring causes costs   which are a function of the relationship maturity in case of the 
relationship lending technique, and are a constant when using financial statement lending. 
Therefore, if banks in the market differ with respect to the lending technique, they will have 
() tdifferent cost curves. The incentive for banks to monitor arises from the assumption of 
prohibitive costs in the case of non-monitoring. Additionally, a bank does not know the 
behavior of the other bank and thus tests if it can underbid its competitor by setting lower loan 
interest rates. It is further assumed that a bank knows the share of good projects in its 
portfolio with perfect foresight. Hence the expected and real shares of good projects are 
assumed to be equal ( . This leads to the typical Bertrand demand function, where a 
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Consequently, if we assume that the banks in the market maximize profits and act in Bertrand 
competition, loan interest rates are driven down.  
 
2.1 The benchmark model: a relationship lending duopoly  
Consider a market with two banks that rely on a relationship lending technique. As already 
mentioned, this means that every bank has “soft” information about the business of a firm 
(e.g. reliability of the borrower, history of the firm, firm’s perspective and new markets). 
Because information quality and the amount of information rises with the maturity of the 
relationship, monitoring costs decrease. There are two explanations for the assumption of a 
decline in monitoring costs during the maturity of the relationship: first, through better 
knowledge about e.g. the quality of intangible goods, the firm’s local market, and export 
opportunities, the quality of information rises and the cost of additional data collection diminishes. Second, asset-based lending is used as a substitute when the relationship is in an 
infant state (Boot 2000). Since this lending technique is cost-intensive, switching to 
relationship lending reduces these costs.  
Due to the existence of monitoring costs, the banks only have incentives to monitor their own 
market share of borrowers (( or () ).  ) x x − 1
In a next step, the banks   identifie potentially good projects with a monitoring efficiency 
of 
, ij
, ij φ  and lend to firms with these investment opportunities. Due to the assumed perfect 
foresight, the banks charge the optimal loan interest rate  :  , ij r
, (1.1)  ,, ˆ (( 1 ) ) / ij ij ij rf t x ϕ =+ −  
where  ϕ ˆ  is the expected share of successful projects based on information from previous 
periods. For each credit, both banks faces funding costs  . The funding cost function of the 
banks is: 
j i, p
(1.2)  j i j i j i j i p q q f , , , , )] 1 )( 1 ( [ φ φ − − + = . 
7  
In a final step, the share of successful projects  , ij ϕ  becomes obvious 
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=   Since monitoring costs decline with the relationship duration, every bank has an advantage 
relative to its competitor. Therefore long relationship borrowers of bank i with low 
monitoring costs are short relationship borrowers of bank j with high monitoring costs. 
Result 1: 
Bertrand competition does not lead to marginal cost pricing
8. This is caused by 
monitoring cost advantages of relationship banks that prevent competition except 
market border competition. Because of that the banks have no incentive to price-
discriminate, i.e charging loan interest rates equal to marginal costs. The banks use 
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<insert figure 1> 
2.2 Differences in Lending techniques - the Access of SMEs to External Funds  
We now turn to cases where SMEs are forced to make financial reports that can be used in 
financial statement lending or credit scoring. In the literature it is argued that relationship 
lending plays a role in these cases, too. 
We assume that one ( ) i of the two banks relies on relationship lending and the other (  on 
financial statement lending. As mentioned in 2.1, monitoring costs decline for the bank with 
relationship lending. On the contrary, the bank with financial statement lending faces the 
same monitoring costs for every borrower 
) j
j t . We further assume that the average monitoring 
















 with  ij ϕ ϕ = . We will get comparable results to this case if we consider a credit-scoring bank alternatively to the financial-
statement-lending bank. The difference between the two techniques is simply an improved 
monitoring efficiency which results in higher loan interest rates: 
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For banks engaging in financial statement lending, Bertrand competition implies loan interest 
rates equal to marginal costs: 
(2.1)    
The marginal cost pricing of financial-statement-lending banks results in zero profits: 
(2.2)    
Since financial statement information is publicly available, market entry of another financial 
statement bank is likely if the financial statement bank charges loan interest rates higher than 
marginal costs.  
Result 2: 
Average loan interest rates charged by banks engaged in a market where financial 
statement lending is possible are lower than average interest rates in a relationship 






















As a consequence equilibrium loan interest rates are lower than marginal costs of 
relationship lending banks with short relationship borrowers. Therefore this bank serves only the part of the market which is below the point where 
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<insert figure 2> 
 
 
2.3 Lending to large companies 
In a lending market for large companies, we expect a much higher degree of publicly 
available information. This assumption leads to financial statement monitoring costs that are 
significantly lower than in a SME market:  arg SME l e tt >
tt >
. Relationship lending monitoring costs 
are assumed to be higher and equal to the SME market:   .  relationshiplending financialstatementlending
The monitoring cost function of the financial statement bank is defined as: 
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i x < .  The profit of the financial statement lending bank is equal to zero, as it was shown already in 
2.1: 
(3.3)     () 21 1 * fj Ar f Atx πϕ =− − = 0










=   
Result 3: 
Loan interest rates for large companies are lower than interest rates for small and 
medium enterprises. Therefore relationship lending serves only a small part of the 
market. 
 
<insert figure 3> 
 
3. Interpretation of the Results  
 
With our model we explain the behavior of a relationship bank in different market 
environments. We show that in three variations of the model, relationship lending has 
advantages for a bank. Additionally, we show that if there is a bank which is engaged in 
financial statement lending, this bank is restricting the advantages of the relationship lending 
bank. 
The central results of the model are:  
•  Relationship-lending banks exploit information advantages that result from their 
lending technique (Result 1).  •  If one bank relies on financial statement lending, this bank drives down the profits of 
the relationship lending bank (Result 2). 
•  In the case of low monitoring costs for financial statement lending, the relationship 
lending bank serves only a small fraction of the market. Loan interest rates are directly 
proportional to financial statement monitoring costs. (Result 3) 
Based on these general ideas, we develop three different scenarios to calculate loan interest 
rates. In general, we set funding costs at 2%, monitoring efficiency (except for the case of 
credit scoring) to 95%, and average monitoring costs at 1%. In a first scenario we simulate a 
market with two relationship lending banks. This is likely to reflect a market where financial 
data is not sufficient to do financial statement lending or credit scoring. In a second scenario 
we simulate a market with a relationship lending bank and a credit scoring bank. This is a 
setting where the financial accounting practice of SMEs enables the banks to use credit 
scoring. In a third scenario, we simulate a market with a highly efficient financial statement 
lending bank and a relationship lending bank. This is likely to be a market where financial 
accounting is determined by strong legal requirements. 
The simulation yields interesting results (table 1). First, relationship lending leads to relatively 
high loan interest rates compared to other lending techniques. In a market with two 
relationship lending banks we obtain loan interest rates at 6.5%. Second, when assuming a 
lower efficiency of credit scoring (with a reduction of 15 percentage points of the monitoring 
efficiency to 80%) the realized loan interest rate is 5.1%. In other words, this type of market 
structure leads to lower interest rates than relationship lending. Third, the lowest interest rates 
are realized in a market with one relationship lending and one  highly efficient financial 
statement bank. In this case the equilibrium loan interest rate is 3.8%. <insert table 1> The simulation results stress the importance of the availability of different lending techniques 
to reduce borrowers’ loan interest rates. In practice, especially the market of SMEs lacks high 
quality accounting data, which makes these firms more dependent on relationship banking 
than large companies. Since relationship lending leads to high loan interest rates, SMEs suffer 
from high costs of external funding. For large enterprises, a much higher degree of 
information is public and therefore available without any costs. This enables banks to apply 
transaction based lending (financial-statement-lending or credit-scoring) which reduces loan 
interest rates.  4. Conclusions and Outlook 
SMEs seem to suffer from limited access to external financial resources all over the world. 
Banks usually are reluctant to provide credit to this type of enterprises. This behavior is due to 
the relatively limited publicly available information about SMEs. Legal accounting 
requirements for these enterprises are low, so that managers of SMEs have only small 
incentives to invest in detailed information practices. It is often argued that this specific lack 
of information can be compensated by relationship banking, which enables banks to collect 
detailed information about an individual firm over time. Since this information is exclusive 
and not available to other banks competition in the market of long relationship borrower is 
distorted. We show that because of this distortion there exists a close linkage between the 
lending technique of a bank and the interest rate offered to a firm. While relationship lending 
leads to relatively high interest rates the burden is much lower in the case of financial 
statement lending. 
These results have far-reaching implications for the recent discussion on the introduction of  
international accounting standards in Europe. There are strong arguments for an improvement 
of the current design of accounting standards specifically for SMEs. First, in order to be 
efficient, international accounting standards should apply to all types of enterprises. Second, 
additional information gained through this process would lead to an improvement in decision-
making. Both banks and enterprises would be the beneficiaries of such a change in the 
institutional framework. Third, the introduction of international accounting standards would 
have a self-containing, positive impact on competition within the banking sector.  
Given the large interest on the interdependence of banking and SME finance further research 
is necessary. Since our model is limited to the supply side, adding borrower demand would be 
a natural extension of the model. In such an extended framework interest rate effects are 
expected to be supplemented by reduced demand for credit.  References 
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Lending techniques reconsidered 
In general, lending can be categorized into at least four
1 distinct lending techniques. These 
practices differ mainly by the usage and generation of information (Table A-1):   
•  Financial statement lending is based on evaluating information from the firms’ 
financial statements. The decision to lend depends largely on the strength of the 
balance sheet and income statements. Since SMEs face less legal requirements than 
large companies to publish financial data, financial statement lending is likely to be 
the technique of choice in bank lending to large firms (Udell 2004).  
•  In the case of asset-based lending, credit decisions are principally based on the quality 
of the available collateral. This type of lending causes high monitoring costs and 
requires high-quality receivables and inventory available to pledge (Carey et. al. 2001, 
Berger and Udell 1995, 1998). Boot (2000) identifies asset-based lending as a 
substitute for relationship lending if the term of the relationship is short. 
•  Small business credit scoring is an adaptation of statistical techniques used in 
consumer lending. In addition to information about the financial statements, the 
creditworthiness and history of the owner is heavily weighted (Frame et. al. 2001). In 
practice, small business credit scoring is mostly used for micro enterprises (Saunders 
2001) and is a substitute for financial statement lending with few monitoring costs but 
a high possibility of wrong declarations by the borrower.  
                                            
1 Mostly two lending technologies are described in literature – relationship lending and transaction 
based lending. For our purpose we follow Berger and Udell (2002) which is a bank based view rather 
than the broader six technique view in Udell (2004) who includes factoring and trade credit.    •  Relationship lending is based on the experience of a given bank with a concrete 
borrower and therefore on “soft” information collected over time. Therefore if 
financial data is limited, relationship banking is the technique of choice. 
The common feature of the first three types of lending is that they are based on “hard” 
information; in the literature these lending techniques are called “transaction based”. In 
contrast to transaction-based lending, relationship lending is based on “soft” information. 
Banks may acquire information through the relationship by monitoring borrower performance 
over time under credit arrangements and/or through the provision of other services such as 
deposit accounts. Thus, the main difference between these two types of lending is the 
availability of information to competing banks. Relationship banking is based on collecting 
information over time and therefore produces private information that is only available to the 
specific bank or to a banking network. Since this information cannot be interpreted out of this 
specific context, the relationship-lending bank gains an advantage over its competitors.  Type of 
information
Efficiency Approximation 
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1 We only review the main causes of lax financial reporting discussed in the literature. Other 
possible explanations for lax financial reporting are an inability of owner-managers to 
interpret the information, irrationality, undemanding business circumstances, a difficulty in 
identification of benefits, insufficient information in the reporting system, and a lack of   
primary information necessary to run the business in the accounting data. For further and 
more detailed information, see McMahon (1998). 
2 In concentrated relationship-lending markets, Petersen and Rajan (1994) find that loan 
interest rates decline less than in competitive markets because they are subsidized in favor of 
young relationships. This supports somewhat Greenbaum et. al. (1989) and Sharpe (1990). 
3 By engaging in long-term relationships, firms transmit information about the company and 
its projects to the bank and can therefore reduce loan interest rate and collateral requirements 
(Alen, Sounders and Udell (1991); Nakamura (1993)). Boot and Thakor (1994) demonstrate 
this relationship in a theoretical model without learning effects. 
4 An article similar in spirit to ours is Rajan (1992), which discusses the incentive of firms to 
prevent banks from extracting surplus from them. 
5 The save loan interest rate covers funding costs and contingency risk. 
6 The assumption of unknown project success holds especially for firms without sufficient 
financial reporting practice (e.g. non-listed firms like most SMEs). For firms with a high 
degree of financial reporting (e.g. listed firms) we can generally assume limited liability of 
managers. That is why these firms do apply for loans even if they know they have bad 
projects. They only care about the good state where they can earn positive profits even if the 
probability to improve profits is low. 
7 It is assumed that the bank knows which share of projects will be successful, but does not 
know the probabilities of success of a single investment project. The bank does not lend to                                                                                                                                         
i q projects which are identified as bad (the bank lends to φ  identified good and 
() () i q φ − − 1 1 wrongly identified bad creditors) 
8 The Bertrand type competition does not lead to extreme outcomes because of non-
homogeneity of monitoring costs. However, if the Bertrand-competing banks prefer activity, a 
reduction in loan interest rate r* would lead to a marginal profit below marginal costs. We 
follow Bracoud (2002) in arguing that even if banks prefer activity, it does not lead to 
irrational behavior in enhancing market share even if marginal profits are lower than marginal 
costs. 
9 This equilibrium is static and does not hold for a dynamic case since no new borrower is 
served. In a dynamic case, it is suggested that the bank subsidizes new borrowers by lending 
at the cost of old borrowers. 
10 As above this equilibrium does not hold in the dynamic case. The relationship-lending bank 
would leave the market. 